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We consider the degrees of non-computability (Weihrauch degrees) of finding winning strate-
gies (or more generally, Nash equilibria) in infinite sequential games with certain winning
sets (or more generally, outcome sets). In particular, we show that as the complexity of the
winning sets increases in the difference hierarchy, the complexity of constructing winning
strategies increases in the effective Borel hierarchy.
1 Overview
We consider questions of (non)computability related to infinite sequential games played by any
countable number of players. The best-known example of such games are Gale-Stewart games
[19], which are two-player win/lose games. The existence of winning strategies in (special cases
of) Gale-Stewart games is often employed to show that truth-values in certain logics are well-
determined. The degrees of noncomputability of variations of (Borel) determinacy [40] can be
studied using our techniques, and several are fully classified.
This work falls within the research programme to study the computational content of math-
ematical theorems in the Weihrauch lattice, which was outlined by Brattka and Gherardi
in [7]. In particular, it continues the investigation of the Weihrauch degrees of operations map-
ping games to their equilibria started in [46]. There, finding pure and mixed Nash equilibria in
two-player games with finitely many actions in strategic form were classified.
One motivation for this line of inquiry is the general stance that solution concepts in game
theory can only be convincing if the players are capable of (at least jointly) computing them,
taken e.g. in [48]. Even if we allow for some degree of hypercomputation, or are, e.g., willing to
tacitly replace actually attaining a solution concept by some process (slowly) converging to it,
we still have to reject solution concepts with too high a Weihrauch degree.
The results for determinacy of specific pointclasses that we provide are a refinement of results
obtained in reverse mathematics by Nemoto, MedSalem and Tanaka [45]; the first is also a
uniformization of a result by Cenzer and Remmel [14]. For some represented pointclass Γ, let
DetΓ : Γ⇒ {0, 1}
N be the map taking a Γ-subset A of Cantor space to a (suitably encoded) Nash
equilibrium in the sequential two-player game with alternating moves where the first player wins
if the induced play is in A, and the second player wins otherwise. Let A be the closed subsets
of Cantor space, and D := {U \ U ′ | U,U ′ ∈ A}. Some of our results are:
Theorem. DetA ≡W C{0,1}N and DetD ≡W C{0,1}N ⋆ lim.
∗An extended abstract of this work has appeared in the Proceedings of CiE 2015 [38].
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We have two remarks. One, by combining the preceding theorem with the main result of
[10], we find that DetD is equivalent to the Bolzano-Weierstrass-Theorem. This may be a bit
unexpected in particular seeing that C{0,1}N ⋆ lim is not (yet) known to contain a plethora of
mathematical theorems (unlike, e.g., C{0,1}N). Two, we already need to use a limit operator
in order to move up one level of the difference hierarchy – rather than being able to move
up one level in the Borel hierarchy as one may have expected naively. Thus, this observation
may complement Harvey Friedman’s famous result [18] that proving Borel determinacy requires
repeated use of the axiom of replacement.
Another group of results is based on inspecting the various results extending Borel deter-
minacy to more general classes of games (and solution concepts) in [34, 35, 36, 37]. If we
instantiate these generic results with specific determinacy version as above, we can prove for
some of them that they are actually optimal w.r.t. Weihrauch reducibility. We shall state two
such classifications explicitly.
Consider two-player sequential games with finitely many outcomes and antagonistic (inverse
of each other) linear preferences over the outcomes. For any upper set of outcomes w.r.t. some
player’s preference let the corresponding set of plays be open or closed. Let NEapO∪A be the
operation taking such a game (suitably encoded) and producing a Nash equilibrium. Then:
Theorem. NEapO∪A ≡W C{0,1}N × LPO
∗
Those games will even have subgame-perfect equilibria, and we let SPEO∪A be the operation
mapping such games to a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Theorem. SPEO∪A ≡W lim
Various further classifications are obtained, and adhere to the scheme that algebraic combi-
nations of very common Weihrauch degrees appear, which is already exhibited by our examples
above.
2 Fundamentals
2.1 Background on represented spaces
We briefly recall some fundamental concepts on represented spaces following [49], to which the
reader shall also be referred for a more detailed presentation. The concept behind represented
spaces essentially goes back to Weihrauch and Kreitz [31], the name may have first been
used by Brattka [3]. A represented space is a pair X = (X, δX ) of a set X and a partial
surjection δX :⊆ NN → X. A function between represented spaces is a function between the
underlying sets. For f : X→ Y and F :⊆ NN → NN, we call F a realizer of f (notation F ⊢ f),
iff δY (F (p)) = f(δX(p)) for all p ∈ dom(fδX), i.e. if the following diagram commutes:
NN
F
−−−−→ NNyδX yδY
X
f
−−−−→ Y
A map between represented spaces is called computable (continuous), iff it has a computable
(continuous) realizer. Similarly, we call a point x ∈ X computable, iff there is some computable
S. Le Roux & A. Pauly 3
p ∈ NN with δX(p) = x. A priori, the notion of a continuous map between represented spaces
and a continuous map between topological spaces are distinct and should not be confused!
Given two represented spacesX,Y we obtain a third represented space C(X,Y) of continuous
functions from X to Y by letting 0n1p be a [δX → δY ]-name for f , if the n-th Turing machine
equipped with the oracle p computes a realizer for f . As a consequence of the UTM theorem,
C(−,−) is the exponential in the category of continuous maps between represented spaces, and
the evaluation map is even computable (as are the other canonic maps, e.g. currying).
This function space constructor, together with two represented spaces, N = (N, δN) and
S = ({⊥,⊤}, δS), allows us to obtain a model of Escardo´’s synthetic topology [16]. The
representation are given by δN(0
n10N) = n, δS(0
N) = ⊥ and δS(p) = ⊤ for p 6= 0
N. It is
straightforward to verify that the computability notion for the represented space N coincides
with classical computability over the natural numbers. The Sierpin´ski space S in turn allows
us to formalize semi-decidability. The computable functions f : N→ S are exactly those where
f−1({⊤}) is recursively enumerable (and thus f−1({⊥}) co-recursively enumerable).
In general, for any represented space X we obtain two spaces of subsets of X; the space of
open sets O(X) by identifying f ∈ C(X,S) with f−1({⊤}), and the space of closed sets A(X)
by identifying f ∈ C(X,S) with f−1({⊥}). The properties of the spaces of open and closed sets,
namely computability of the usual operations, follow from a few particular computable functions
on Sierpin´ski space S and the fundamental function space properties.
We require further classes of sets (often called pointclasses in this context) as represented
spaces. A general approach to this is found in synthetic descriptive set theory suggested in [51].
As shown in [21], that approach yields consistent definitions with the ones used inMoschovakis’
effective descriptive set theory [42]. Here, we shall just directly provide representations that
suffice. Some definitions essentially already appeared in [5] and/or [53].
Definition 1. Given a represented pointclass Γ, we represent {AC | A ∈ Γ} by reinterpreting
a name for A as a name for AC . Furthermore, we represent {
⋃
i∈NAi | ∀i ∈ N Ai ∈ Γ}
by identifying suitable sequences in ΓN. Given represented pointclasses Γ1,Γ2, we represent
{A \B | A ∈ Γ1, B ∈ Γ2} by identifying the suitable pairs in Γ1 × Γ2.
Note that only the first of the three constructions preserves admissibility of the representa-
tions.
We will make use of the jump of a represented space. This is based on the limit operator
lim :⊆ NN → NN defined via lim(p)(n) = limi→∞ p(〈n, i〉). We then define (X, δX )′ = (X, δX ◦
lim). This is iterated along X(0) := X and X(n+1) := (X(n))′. In [10], the jump was extended
to multivalued functions via (f : X⇒ Y)[n] := (f : X[n] ⇒ Y).
2.2 Informal background on infinite sequential games
We use the formal definitions of sequential games and related concepts from [36, 37] and [34].
Informally, given a fixed (w.l.o.g.) set C, we let the players sequentially choose elements in C
until an infinite sequence in Cω is generated. Whose turn it is depends on the finite history
of choices. The outcome (from a set O) of the game depends on the generated sequence in
Cω, and each player may compare outcomes via a binary relation over O, called preference. A
strategy of a player is an object that fully specifies what the choice of the player would be for
each possible finite history that requires this player to play. A combination of one strategy per
player is called a strategy profile and it induces one unique infinite sequence in Cω, and thus
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one unique outcome. So, preferences may be lifted from outcomes to strategy profiles. A Nash
equilibrium is a profile such that no player can unilaterally change strategies and induce a (new)
outcome that he or she prefers over the old one. We also consider a refinement of the concept
of a Nash equilibrium, namely subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. Intuitively, a strategy profile is
subgame-perfect, if it still forms an equilibrium if the game were started at an arbitrary history.
2.3 Background on infinite sequential games
Our presentation of the required background on infinite sequential games is modelled closely on
the corresponding section in [37], and on [34].
It is convenient to introduce the abstract notion of a game first, before introducing additional
structure later on. A game is a tuple 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, (≺a)a∈A〉 consisting of a non-empty set A of
agents or players, for each agent a ∈ A a non-empty set Sa of strategies, and for each agent a ∈ A
a preference relation ≺a ⊆
(∏
a∈A Sa
)
×
(∏
a∈A Sa
)
. The generic setting suffices to introduce
the notion of a Nash equilibrium: A strategy profile σ ∈
(∏
a∈A Sa
)
is called a Nash equilibrium,
if for any agent a ∈ A and any strategy sa ∈ Sa we find ¬ (σ ≺a σa7→sa), where σa7→sa is defined
by σa7→sa(b) = σ(b) for b ∈ A \ {a} and σa7→sa(a) = sa. In words, no agent prefers over a Nash
equilibrium some other situation that only differs in her choice of strategy.
Definition 2 (Infinite sequential game, cf. [34, Definition 1.1]). An infinite sequential game is
an object 〈A,C, d,O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 complying with the following.
1. A is a non-empty set (of agents).
2. C is a non-empty set (of choices).
3. d : C∗ → A (assigns a decision maker to each stage of the game).
4. O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes of the game).
5. v : Cω → O (uses outcomes to value the infinite sequences of choices).
6. Each ≺a is a binary relation over O (modelling the preference of agent a).
The intuition behind the definition is that agents take turns to make a choice. Whose turn
it is depends on the past choices via the function d (which often will be just alternating play).
Over time, the agents thus jointly generate some infinite sequence, which is mapped by v to
the outcome of the game. Note that using a single set of actions C for each step just simplifies
the notation; a generalization to varying action sets is straightforward. In the present paper,
typically A and O will be countable, and C even finite.
The infinite sequential games are linked to abstract games as follows: the agents remain the
agents and the strategies of agent a are the functions sa : d
−1({a}) → C. We can then safely
regard a strategy profile as a function σ : C∗ → C whose induced play is defined below, where
for an infinite sequence p ∈ Cω we let pn be its n-th value, and p≤n = p<n+1 ∈ C
∗ be its finite
prefix of length n.
Definition 3 (Induced play and outcome, cf. [34, Definition 1.3]). Let s : C∗ → C be a strategy
profile. The play p = pλ(s) ∈ Cω induced by s starting at λ ∈ C∗ is defined inductively through
its prefixes: pn = λn for n ≤ |λ| and pn := s(p<n) for n > |λ|. Also, v ◦ pλ(s) is the outcome
induced by s starting at λ. The play (resp. outcome) induced by s is the play (resp. outcome)
induced by s starting at ε.
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In the usual way to regard an infinite sequential game as a special abstract game, an agent
prefers a strategy profile σ to σ′, iff he prefers the outcome induced by σ to the outcome
induced by σ′. And indeed we shall call a strategy profile of an infinite sequential game a Nash
equilibrium, iff it is a Nash equilibrium with these preferences. In a certain notation overload,
we will in particular use the same symbols for the preferences over strategy profiles and the
preferences over outcomes.
We also consider a refinement of the concept of a Nash equilibrium, namely subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria. Intuitively, a strategy profile is subgame-perfect, if it still forms an equilibrium
if the game were started in an arbitrary position.
As a important special case we consider win/lose games. These are games with two players
a, b and two outcomes wa, wb, where a prefers wa to wb and b prefers wb to wa. We say that a
wins the game, if outcome wa is reached, and call the set of all plays that induce outcome wa
as the winning set for a (likewise for b and wb).
2.4 Background on Weihrauch reducibility
A few years ago several authors (Gherardi and Marcone [20], P. [47, 46], Brattka and
Gherardi [7]) noticed that a reducibility notion based on previous work byWeihrauch [55, 56]
would provide a very interesting setting for a metamathematical inquiry into the computational
content of mathematical theorems. The fundamental research programme was outlined in [7],
and the introduction in [9] may serve as a recent survey.
Definition 4 (Weihrauch reducibility). Let f, g be multi-valued functions on represented spaces.
Then f is said to be Weihrauch reducible to g, in symbols f ≤W g, if there are computable
functions K,H :⊆ NN → NN such that K〈id, GH〉 ⊢ f for all G ⊢ g.
The relation ≤W is reflexive and transitive. We use ≡W to denote equivalence regarding
≤W, and by <W we denote strict reducibility. By W we refer to the partially ordered set of
equivalence classes. As shown in [47, 8], W is a distributive lattice, and also the usual product
operation on multivalued function induces an operation × on W. The algebraic structure on W
has been investigated in further detail in [25, 12].
There are two relevant unary operations defined on W, both happen to be closure operators.
The operation ∗ was introduced in [47, 46] by setting f0 := idNN , f
n+1 := f × fn and then
f∗(n, x) := fn(x). It corresponds to making any finite number of parallel uses of f available.
Similarly, the parallelization operation ̂ from [8, 7] makes countably many parallel uses available
by f̂(x0, x1, x2, . . .) := (f(x0), f(x1), f(x2), . . .).
We will make use of an operation ⋆ defined on W that captures aspects of function compo-
sition. Following [10, 11], let f ⋆ g := max≤W{f0 ◦ g0 | f ≡W f0 ∧ g ≡W g0}. We understand
that the quantification is running over all suitable functions f0, g0 with matching types for the
function composition. It is not obvious that this maximum always exists, this is shown in [12]
using an explicit construction for f ⋆ g. Like function composition, ⋆ is associative but gener-
ally not commutative. We use ⋆ to introduce iterated composition via setting f (0) := idNN and
f (n+1) = f (n) ⋆ f .
All computable multivalued functions with a computable point in their domain are Weihrauch
equivalent, this degree is denoted by 1.
An important source for examples of Weihrauch degrees that are relevant in order to classify
theorems are the closed choice principles studied in e.g. [7, 6]:
6 Weihrauch degrees of finding equilibria
Definition 5. Given a represented space X, the associated closed choice principle CX is the
partial multivalued function CX :⊆ A(X)⇒ X mapping a non-empty closed set to an arbitrary
point in it.
For any uncountable compact metric space X we find that CX ≡W C[0,1]. For well-behaved
spaces, using closed choice iteratively does not increase its power, in particular CN ⋆CN ≡W CN
and C[0,1] ⋆C[0,1] ≡W C[0,1]. Likewise, it was shown that CRn ≡W CRn ⋆CRn ≡W CN×C[0,1] ≡W
CN ⋆ C[0,1] ≡W C[0,1] ⋆ CN for any n > 0. Closed choice for [0, 1] and {0, 1}
N is incomparable.
Furthermore, C{0,1}N ≡W Ĉ{0,1}N ≡W Ĉ{0,1}. The degree C[0,1] is closely linked to WKL in
reverse mathematics, while CN is Weihrauch-complete for functions computable with finitely
many mindchanges.
Another typical degree is LPO, which has important representatives such as ¬ : S→ S, the
characteristic function of 0N, the characteristic function of 0 in R, 6= : {0, 1}N×{0, 1}N → {0, 1}
and IsEmpty : A({0, 1}N)→ {0, 1}.
Furthermore, we require the degree obtained from the limit operator lim :⊆ NN → NN. This
degree was studied by von Stein [54], Mylatz [43] and Brattka [4, 5], with the latter noting
in [5] that it is closely connected to the Borel hierarchy. Hoyrup, Rojas and Weihrauch
have shown that lim is equivalent the Radon-Nikodym derivative in [27]; while [52] by P. and
Fouche´ exhibited some constructions of Radon measures that are equivalent to lim. The degree
lim also appears in the context of models of hypercomputation as shown by Ziegler [58, 57],
and captures precisely the additional computational power that certain solutions to general
relativity could provide beyond computability [26]. It is related to the examples above via
CN × C[0,1] <W lim ≡W lim× lim <W lim ⋆ lim, and LPO <W LPO
∗ <W CN <W lim ≡W L̂PO.
The (strict) hierarchy (lim(n))n∈N plays a very similar role in the Weihrauch degrees as the
iterated Halting problems fill in the Turing degrees. We always find f [n] ≤W f ⋆ lim
(n), and for
many natural functions f , equivalence holds, since (f × id)[n] ≡W f ⋆ lim
(n).
2.5 Defining the problems of interest
Let Γ be a represented pointclass over {0, 1}N. In a straightforward fashion, we can obtain a
representation of the infinite sequential games with countably many agents, countably many
outcomes, sets of choices C = {0, 1} and Γ-measurable valuation function v : {0, 1}N → O.
The representation encodes the number of agents and outcomes available, for each upper set of
outcome the Γ-set of plays resulting in it, the map d as a look-up table, and the relations ≺a
as look-up tables. We always assume that the inverse of any preference relation is well-founded
(this guarantees that equilibria exist). Using a canonic isomorphism {0, 1}∗ ∼= N, we will pretend
that the space of strategy profiles in such a game is {0, 1}N.
We now consider the following multivalued functions:
1. DetΓ takes a two-player win/lose game as input, where the first player has a winning set
in Γ. Valid outputs are the Nash equilibria, i.e. the pairs of strategies where one strategy
is a winning strategy.
2. WinΓ has the same inputs as DetΓ, and decides which player (if any) has a winning strategy.
3. FindWSΓ is the restriction of DetΓ to games where the first player has a winning strategy.
4. NEΓ takes as input a game with countably many players, finitely many outcomes, and
linear preferences, where each upper set of outcomes (w.r.t. each player preference) comes
from a Γ-set. The valid outputs are the Nash equilibria.
S. Le Roux & A. Pauly 7
5. NEωoΓ takes as input a game with countably many players, countably many outcomes, and
linear preferences, where each upper set of outcomes (w.r.t. each player preference) comes
from a Γ-set. The valid outputs are the Nash equilibria.
6. NEapΓ is the restriction of NEΓ to the two-player games with antagonistic preferences
(i.e. ≺a=≺
−1
b ).
7. SPEΓ takes as input a two-player game with finitely many outcomes and antagonistic
preferences, where each upper set of outcomes comes from a Γ-set. Valid outputs are the
subgame perfect equilibria.
We abbreviate Γ := {UC | U ∈ Γ}. Some trivial reducibilities between these problems are:
WinΓ ≡W WinΓ, DetΓ ≡W DetΓ, FindWSΓ ≤W DetΓ ≤W NE
ap
Γ∪Γ
≤W SPEΓ∪Γ and NE
ap
Γ ≤W
NEΓ.
Throughout the paper we assume that Γ is determined (which implies that all operations
are well-defined in the first place), closed under rescaling and finite intersection with clopens,
and that ∅, {0, 1}N ∈ Γ. All such closure properties (including those appearing as conditions in
the results) are assumed to hold in a uniformly computable way, e.g. given a name for a set in
Γ and a clopen, we can compute a name for the intersection of the set with the clopen. With
rescaling we refer to the operation (w,A) 7→ {wp | p ∈ A} : {0, 1}∗ × Γ→ Γ and its inverse.
2.6 The difference hierarchy
The pointclasses we shall study in particular are the levels of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy.
Intuitively, these are the sets that can be obtained as boolean combinations of open sets; and
their level denotes the least complexity of a suitable term. Roughly following [30, Section 22.E],
we shall recall the definition of the difference hierarchy. We define a function par from the
countable ordinals to {0, 1} by par(α) = 0, if there is a limit ordinal β and a number n ∈ N such
that α = β + 2n; and par(α) = 1 otherwise. For a fixed ordinal α, we let Dα be the collection
of sets D definable in terms of a family (Uλ)λ<α of open sets via:
x ∈ D ⇔ par (inf{β | x ∈ Uβ}) 6= par(α)
In the preceding formula, we understand that inf ∅ = α. In particular, D0 = {∅} and
D1 = O.
For our constructions, a different characterization is more useful, though: For some pointclass
Γ, let D(Γ) := {
⋃
i∈I viUi | ∀i, j ∈ Ivi ∈ {0, 1}
∗ ∧ Ui ∈ Γ ∧ vi ⊀ vj}.
Lemma 6. Dα+1 = D(Dα) and, more generally, Dα = D
(⋃
λ<αDλ
)
Proof. The proof proceeds via induction. The base case isD1 = O = D({{0, 1}
N}), and straight-
forward. Now assume that the claim holds for all β < α.
IfA ∈ Dα+1, then there is a witnessing family (Uβ)β<α+1 of open sets. Let Uα =
⋃
i∈I vi{0, 1}
N
with a prefix free family (vi)i∈I . For λ < α and i ∈ I, we define an open set U
i
λ := {y ∈
{0, 1}N | viy ∈ Uλ}. Then let A
i ∈ Dα be the set constructed from the family (U
i
λ)λ<α, and let
U i :=
(
Ai
)C
. Now A =
⋃
i∈I viU
i witnesses that A ∈ D(Dα).
If A ∈ D(Dα), then there are witnesses (vi)i∈I and (U
i)i∈I with U
i ∈ Dα. The latter is
in turn witnessed by families of open sets (U iβ)β<α. For β < α, let Uβ =
⋃
i∈I viU
i
β , this is an
open set again. Additionally, let Uα =
⋃
i∈I vi{0, 1}
N. Now the family (Uλ)λ<α+1 witnesses that
A ∈ Dα+1.
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Observation 7. If An is in Dα for all n ∈ N, so is A := ∪n∈N0n1An.
Proof. For all n the set An can be written ∪i∈InvniAni, where vni 6≺ vnj and Ani ∈ Dλni for
some λni < α, so A = ∪n∈N,i∈In0
n1vniAni, where 0
n1vni 6≺ 0
m1vmj .
Corollary 8. If Bn is in Dα for all n ∈ N, so is B := {0N} ∪
⋃
n∈N 0
n1Bn.
A fundamental result on the difference hierarchy is the Hausdorff-Kuratowski theorem stating
that
⋃
α<ω1
Dα = ∆
0
2 (where ω1 is the smallest uncountable ordinal), see e.g. [30, Theorem 22.27].
3 The computational content of some determinacy principles
We begin by classifying the simplest non-computable games, namely games where the first player
wants to reach some closed set. This classification essentially is a uniform version of a result by
Cenzer and Remmel [14].
Theorem 9. FindWSA ≡W DetA ≡W C{0,1}N .
Proof. C{0,1}N ≤W FindWSA Given a closed subset A ∈ A({0, 1}
N), we can easily obtain the
game where only player 1 moves, and player 1 wins iff the induced play falls in A. If A is
non-empty, then player 1 has a winning strategy: Play any infinite sequence in A.
FindWSA ≤W DetA Trivial.
DetA ≤W C{0,1}N Given the open winning set of player 2, we can modify the game tree by
ending the game once we know for sure that player 2 will win. Now the set of strategy
profiles where either player 1 wins and player 2 cannot win, or player 2 wins and player 1
cannot prolong the game, is a closed set effectively obtainable from the game. Moreover,
it is non-empty, and any such strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 10. WinA ≡W LPO
Proof. This follows by combining the constructions from the preceding theorem with the fact
that IsEmpty : A({0, 1}N)→ {0, 1} is equivalent to LPO.
We can use the results for A as the base case for classifying the strength of determinacy for
the difference hierarchy.
Lemma 11 (1). DetD(Γ) ≤W C{0,1}N ⋆
̂(DetΓ ×WinΓ) and WinD(Γ) ≤W LPO ⋆s ŴinΓ.
2
Proof. Let the winning set of the first player in the original game be
⋃
i∈N viUi. We use
̂DetΓ ×WinΓ to find out who wins each of the games with winning sets Ui, and a Nash equilib-
rium for each such game. Let vni be the subsequence of the vn where the first player wins.
Now consider the game where the first player’s winning set is the open set U ′ =
⋃
i∈N vni{0, 1}
N.
The first player is winning this derived game, iff he is winning the original game. Thus, by
Proposition 10 the claim WinD(Γ) ≤W LPO ⋆s ŴinΓ follows. Due to Theorem 9, we can use
1This is a generalization of the proof idea for [45, Theorem 3.7] by Nemoto, MedSalem and Tanaka. [45,
Theorem 3.7] states that ACA0 proves determinacy for D(Σ
0
1).
2Here, ⋆s denotes the analogue of ⋆ for strong Weihrauch reducibility (cf [10]). Its precise definition is not
important in the following, and the statement remains true if ⋆s is replaced by ⋆.
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C{0,1}N to find a Nash equilibrium of this game. Then we combine this Nash equilibrium with
those of the subgames to get a Nash equilibrium of the entire game, by letting both players
play their equilibrium strategy in any of the subgames rooted at a vn, and above those, let-
ting the first player try to reach some vni and the second to avoid them. This is the claim
DetD(Γ) ≤W C{0,1}N ⋆ ̂DetΓ ×WinΓ.
Observation 12. Det⋃
n∈N
Γn ≡W
∐
n∈NDetΓn and Win
⋃
n∈N
Γn ≡W
∐
n∈NWinΓn
We will relate deciding the winner and finding a winning strategy for games induced by sets
from some level of the difference hierarchy to the lessor limited principle of omniscience and
the law of excluded middle for Σ0n-formulae of the corresponding level. These principles were
studied in [1, 10, 24] (among others). Let
(
Σ0n − LLPO
)
:⊆ {0, 1}N×{0, 1}N ⇒ {0, 1} be defined
via i ∈
(
Σ0n − LLPO
)
(p0, p1) iff ∀k1∃k2 . . . ♮kn pi(〈k1, . . . , kn〉) = 1 (where ♮ = ∀ if n is odd and
♮ = ∃ otherwise). Let
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
: {0, 1}N → {0, 1} be defined via
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
(p) = 1 iff
∀k1∃k2 . . . ♮kn p(〈k1, . . . , kn〉) = 1 and
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
(p) = 0 otherwise. Then:
Proposition 13.
(
Σ0n+1 − LLPO
)
≡W LLPO
[n] and
(
Σ0n+1 − LEM
)
≡W LPO
[n]
Lemma 14. ̂(Σ0n − LLPO) ≤W DetDn and
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
≤W WinDn .
Proof. We will first describe the construction for
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
≤W WinDn , which will then be
reused for the remaining claim. The game structure will only depend on the parameter n, but
not on the actual input for
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
. This input acts only on the winning set.
The game works as follows: The second player may pick some k1 ∈ N, or refuse to play. If
the second player picks a number, then the first player may pick k2 ∈ N or refuse to play. This
alternating choice continues until kn−1 has been chosen, or a player refuses to pick. A player
refusing to pick a number loses. If all numbers are picked, the winner depends on the input p
to Σ0n − LEM as follows: If n is even and ∃kn p(〈k1, . . . , kn〉) = 1, then player 1 wins. If n is
odd, and ∃kn p(〈k1, . . . , kn〉) = 0, then player 2 wins. Note that this always describes an open
component Upicked of the winning set of the respective player.
Furthermore, note that the set of plays Uj where a value for kj was chosen is always an open
set. Now the condition that the second player refused to pick first is UC1 ∪(U2∩U3)∪(U4∩U5)∪. . ..
This makes for a winning set in Dn, as required. If player 1 has a winning strategy in the game,
the answer to
(
Σ0n − LEM
)
(p) is 1, if player 2 wins, it is 0.
The game for the reduction ̂(Σ0n − LLPO) ≤W DetDn adds two layers above the game dis-
cussed before. First, player 2 picks an index j ∈ N of one of the input pairs 〈〈p01, p
1
1〉, 〈p
0
2, p
1
2〉, . . . , 〉
of ̂(Σ0n − LLPO), and loses the game if he refuses to pick. Then player 1 picks i ∈ {0, 1}, and
they play the game above on pij . The extra layers do not impact the complexity of the winning
set, in particular since the first two natural numbers are both to be chosen by player 2. The
map j 7→ i extractable from player 1’s winning strategy is a valid solution to ̂(Σ0n − LLPO).
Theorem 15. DetDn+1 ≡W C
[n]
{0,1}N
and WinDn+1 ≡W LPO
[n].
Proof. Note that ̂LLPO[n] ≡W L̂LPO
[n]
and L̂PO[n] ≡W lim
(n+1). One direction of the equiv-
alences is provided by Lemma 14 (while taking into consideration Proposition 13). The other
direction is shown by induction. The base case is provided by Theorem 9 and Proposition 10.
The induction step uses Lemma 11.
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The main obstacle for extending Theorem 15 to the transfinite levels of the difference hier-
archy lies in the absence of a standard representation for the space of countable ordinals, which
would be required to formulate the statement in the first place. This problem is (partially)
addressed in [50]. In the mean time, we can give part of the result for the ω-th level:
Corollary 16. DetDω ≤W C{0,1}N ⋆
̂(∐
n∈N lim
(n)
)
and WinDω ≤W LPO ⋆
̂(∐
n∈N lim
(n)
)
Knowing the Weihrauch degree of a mapping entails some information about the Turing
degrees of outputs relative to the Turing degrees of inputs, this was explored in e.g. [8, 10, 9, 48].
Thus, we can obtain the following corollaries:
Corollary 17. Any computable game with a winning condition in Dn+1 has a winning strategy
s such that s′ is computable relative to ∅(n+1), and there is a computable game of this type such
that any winning strategy computes a PA-degree relative to ∅(n).
Corollary 18. Let (Gi)i∈N be an effective enumeration of computable games with winning
conditions in Dn+1, and define w ∈ {0, 1}
N via w(i) = 1 iff the first player has a winning
strategy in Gi. Then w ≤T ∅
(n+1), and there is an enumeration (Gi)i∈N such that w ≡T ∅
(n+1).
Corollary 19. There is a Σ0n+1-measurable function mapping games with winning conditions
in Dn to winning strategies, but no Σ
0
n-measurable such function.
Proof. As shown in [5], the map lim(n) is Weihrauch-complete for the (effectively) Σ0n+1-measurable
functions. From Theorem 15 we may conclude that lim(n) <W DetDn+1 <W lim
(n+1).
Before ending this section, we shall make explicit a feature of the constructions used above:
Proposition 20. Consider a pointclass Γ that is closed under the operation (An)n∈N 7→(
{01N} ∪
⋃
n∈N 1
n0An
)
. Then:
FindWSΓ ≡W ̂FindWSΓ
Proof. Given a sequence of games, we construct a single combined game as follows: The second
player picks a natural number, and loses the game if he fails to do so. If a number is chosen,
the players proceed to the game with the corresponding index. If the first player has winning
strategies in all input games, he can win the combined game by playing their combination – and
only by doing so.
4 The complexity of equilibrium transfer
In [34, 35, 36, 37], various results were provided that transfer Borel determinacy (or, somewhat
more general, determinacy for some pointclass), to prove the existence of Nash equilibria (and
sometimes even subgame-perfect equilibria) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential
games. In this section, we shall inspect those constructions and extract Weihrauch reductions
from them.
In [35], the first author gave a very general construction that allows to extend determinacy
of win/lose games to the existence of Nash equilibria for two-player games of the same type. For
brevity, we only consider the strength of the toy example from [35] here:
Theorem 21 (Equilibrium transfer). NEapΓ ≤W Det
∗
Γ ×Win
∗
Γ.
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Proof. For any upper set of outcomes (for either players preferences), we construct the win/lose
derived game where that player wins, iff he enforces the set, and loses otherwise. There are
finitely many such games, so we can use Win∗Γ to decide which are won and which are lost.
As shown in [35], there will be a combination of upper sets of outcomes for each player, such
that if both players enforce their upper set, this forms a Nash equilibrium. We use Det∗Γ to
compute Nash equilibria for all derived games in parallel, and then simply select the suitable
strategies.
Techniques suitable for multiplayer sequential games were then introduced in [34], again by
the first author. The computational content differs somewhat depending on whether there are
finitely many different outcomes, or countably many.
Theorem 22 (Constructing Nash equilibria). NEΓ ≤W ŴinΓ × D̂etΓ,
NEωoΓ ≤W (lim ⋆ŴinΓ)× D̂etΓ
Proof. Let us first prove the first statement. Let us consider a game with finitely many players.
(Considering countably many players would be possible, but it would reduce to the finite case
since there are only finitely many possible preference relations.) For each node of the game and
each upper interval of the preference of the player owning the node (that is, for countably many
cases) let us do two things in parallel: on the one hand, invoke WinΓ and ask who is winning
the win/lose subgame rooted at the node where all the opponents of the node owner team up
and try to yield an outcome outside of the given preference-upper interval; on the other hand,
invoke DetΓ and obtain a Nash equilibrium for that same game. We claim that this information
suffices to computably build a Nash equilibrium for the original game along the proof from [34]:
indeed, the best guarantee [34, Definition 2.5] of a player, which is the smallest preference-upper
interval that the player can enforce, can be computed since we already know who wins the
relevant derived games thanks to WinΓ; the existential witness from [34, Lemma 2.6] is a Nash
equilibrium that has been already computed by DetΓ; which is enough to deepen the guarantee
as in [34, Definition 2.7] and build the strategy profile σ [34, Lemma 2.8]; and finally, the threats
that [34, Theorem 2.9] attaches along the play of σ are given by the Nash equilibria that have
been already computed by DetΓ.
Let us now consider the similar, second statement. At each node, the associate games are
now countably many, so knowing who wins each of them no longer suffices to compute the best
guarantee of the node owner. To this purpose we use one lim operator per node, and the rest
follows as in the finite case above, so NEωoΓ ≤W (l̂im ⋆ ŴinΓ)× D̂etΓ, and the claim follows since
lim ≡W l̂im.
A further improvement on the techniques in [34] were provided by the authors in [36, 37].
These techniques in particular suffice to prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in
antagonistic games (this implies two players and finitely many outcomes).
Theorem 23. SPEΓ ≤W ŴinΓ × D̂etΓ
Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 22 let us ask at every node who wins the derived games
and ask for a corresponding Nash equilibrium. These two pieces of information together provide
the existential witness needed in the third condition of [37, Lemma 16], so by the recursive
construction in the proof of this lemma, its conclusion follows computably. Let us invoke this
conclusion once for each of the two players and combine the obtained strategies into a strategy
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profile, which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium by determinacy assumptions. (See [37, Lemma
17] for the details.)
5 Deciding the winner and finding Nash equilibria
The results in Section 3 show that for many concrete examples of Γ, the problem DetΓ is
inherently multivalued, i.e. not equivalent to any functions between admissible spaces. On the
other hand, the upper bounds provided in Section 4 all include WinΓ, which is of course single-
valued. In the current section, we will explore some converse reductions, from deciding the
winner to finding Nash equilibria. This generally requires some (rather tame) requirements on
the pointclasses involved.
Lemma 24. Let Γ be obtained by Γ1 by first closing under finite union, rescaling and union
with clopens; and then adding complements. Then:
Win∗Γ1 ≤W NE
ap
Γ
Proof. We first informally describe the construction. Given n win/lose games, the first player
starts by announcing which of these games she believes she can win. Then the second player
can choose one of the listed games to play. If the first player did not claim any winnable games,
the game ends and the outcome is 0. If the first player claimed to be able to win k out of n
games, then the outcomes of the games subsequently chosen by the second player are scaled up
to k,−k. Thus, the first player has every reason to list precisely those games she can actually
win: If she would not list a game she could win, she trades payoff k− 1 for payoff k. If she lists
a game she cannot win, the second player will subsequently chose and win it, and then the first
player is punished by −k.
The following depicts the construction in case of two input games:
a
a
0 G1 is played with payoffs 1;−1
a
G0 is played with payoffs 1;−1 b
G0 is played with payoffs 2;−2
G1 is played with payoffs 2;−2
It remains to argue that the resulting game actually is a valid input to NEapΓ . We need to
show that any upper set of outcomes is associated with a set of plays belonging to Γ. For k > 0,
the upper set is a finite union of rescaled sets from Γ1, which by assumption is a member of
Γ. For k = 0, to the former we add the clopen set of plays resulting in 0. For k < 0, we add
additional clopens for those subgames played with stakes less than k.
Lemma 25. Let Γ be closed under taking unions with Γ1 and Γ1. Then:
NEapΓ × FindWSΓ1 ≡W NE
ap
Γ
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Proof. As clearly 1 ≤W FindWSΓ, we only need to show NE
ap
Γ × FindWSΓ ≤W NE
ap
Γ . Let G0
be the input game to NEapΓ on the left, and G1 be the input game to FindWSΓ. If Ω is the
(twice ordered) set of outcomes used in G0, then we use the outcome set Ω ∪ {0, 1} for the
newly constructed game, and extend the preferences by 0 ≺a o ≺a 1 and 1 ≺b o ≺b 0 for each
o ∈ Ω. The game tree looks as follows: The second player can choose whether to play in G1 for
outcomes 0 (second player wins) and 1 (second player loses), or to play in G0 for the original
outcomes:
b
G0 G1 7→ 0; 1
In any Nash equilibrium of this game the second player is choosing to play in G0, both
players play a Nash equilibrium inside G0, and the first player is using a winning strategy inside
G1. Thus, all desired information can be recovered.
In order for the constructed game to be valid for NEapΓ , we need that any upper set from Γ
is closed under union with a winning set of player 1.
Corollary 26. Let Γ1 and Γ simultaneously satisfy the criteria of the two preceding lemmata.
Then:
FindWS∗Γ1 ×Win
∗
Γ1 ≤W NE
ap
Γ
Unfortunately, the restrictions on Γ, Γ1 in place in Lemma 25 (and subsequently Corollary
26 are too strong for the application we have in mind. The result of Corollary 26 can be obtained
with weaker conditions though:
Lemma 27. Let Γ be obtained by Γ1 by first closing under finite union, rescaling and union
with clopens; and then adding complements. Then:
FindWS∗Γ1 ×Win
∗
Γ1 ≤W NE
ap
Γ
Proof. The reduction directly combines the constructions in Lemma 24 and Lemma 25. We only
need to argue that the weaker condition on Γ1 and Γ suffices to have the valuation Γ-measurable
in the resulting game. For this, note that the same reasoning as in Lemma 24 applies, with the
addition of a Γ1 set above the other outcomes, and a Γ1 set below.
If we have access to subgame perfect equilibria (and are in a context where they are guar-
anteed to exist), then we can even decide the winner of countably many games in parallel:
Lemma 28. Let Γ1 contain the closed sets and be closed under finite unions and the operation
(An)n∈N 7→
(
{0N} ∪
⋃
n∈N 0
n1An
)
. Let Γ be obtained from Γ1 by closing under complements.
Then:
ŴinΓ1 ≤W SPEΓ
Proof. The input to ŴinΓ1 is a sequence of games (Gi)i∈N with payoffs 0 and 1. From these, we
shall construct a single game G with payoffs 0, 1 and 12 . In G, the first player can move right
as often as he desires. If he moves left once after having gone right n times, then he is faced
with the choice of moving left again and then playing Gn against the second player, or to move
right to receive a payoff of 12 . If player 1 always moves right, he receives a payoff of 1, as in the
picture below.
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a
a
G0
1
2
a
a
G1
1
2
a
a
Gn
1
2
1
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the first player has to chose optimally when deciding
between playing Gn and receiving a guaranteed payoff of
1
2 – which means playing Gn iff he can
win it. Thus, any subgame perfect equilibrium of G allows us to decide the winner of each Gn.
It only remains to show that the outcome sets of G fall into Γ. For each i ∈ N, let Ui ∈ Γ1
be the winning set of the first player in Gi. Then the preimage of {1} is {1}
N ∪
⋃
i∈N 1
i00Ui,
thus in Γ1. The preimage of {
1
2} is an open set, and thus in Γ together with the preimage of
{1, 12}. As Γ is closed under complements, it then contains all relevant preimages.
6 General games with concrete pointclasses
The general constructions put together with the classifications for specific pointclasses allow us
to obtain some concrete Weihrauch degrees. First, we shall see that moving from a win/lose game
with closed and open outcomes to a two-player game with several outcomes just complicates the
operation of finding Nash equilibria by finitely many uses of LPO in parallel:
Theorem 29. NEapO∪A ≡W C{0,1}N × LPO
∗
Proof. For the reduction NEapO∪A ≤W C{0,1}N × LPO
∗, instantiate Theorem 21 with the results
from Theorem 9 and Proposition 10.
For the other direction, note that FindWSA ≡W FindWSO∪A ≡W C{0,1}N as in Theorem 9;
and that Γ1 := A and Γ := O ∪ A satisfy the requirements of Lemma 27, which then provides
the desired result.
The result can actually be strengthened into the following (by noting that the second game
constructed in Lemma 14 is always won by the first player):
Theorem 30. NEap
Dn+1∪Dn+1
≡W C
[n]
{0,1}N
×
(
LPO[n]
)∗
If one wishes to have subgame-perfect equilibria instead of mere Nash equilibria, then count-
ably many uses of LPO become necessary, and the problem becomes equivalent to lim. Note
that as long as there are at least three distinct outcomes, the number of outcomes has no further
impact on the Weihrauch degree (due to the nature of the construction used to prove Lemma
28)– unlike the situation in Theorem 29, where the number of outcomes is related to the number
of times that LPO is used.
Theorem 31. SPE
Dn∪Dn
≡W lim
(n)
Proof. For SPE
Dn∪Dn
≤W lim
(n), instantiate Theorem 23 with the results from Theorem 15,
and note that L̂PO(n) ≡W lim
(n) and C
[n]
{0,1}N
≤W lim
(n+1).
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For the other direction, we use Lemma 28 (applicable by Corollary 8) together with Propo-
sition 10.
Regarding Theorem 22, we do not (yet?) have matching lower bounds for any particular
pointclass. The gap is exemplified by the following:
Corollary 32. C{0,1}N × LPO
∗ ≤W NEO∪A ≤W lim
Proof. The first reduction follows by Theorem 29. The second reduction follows by instantiating
Theorem 22 with the results from Theorem 9 and Proposition 10.
7 Conclusions and Outlook
With Theorem 15, we have shown that the computational strength of determinacy provides a
tight connection between the difference hierarchy and the Borel hierarchy (in form of Corollary
19). Note that winning sets from the difference hierarchy correspond to Boolean combinations of
reachability and safety conditions. Corollary 18 then provides an upper bound and a worst case
for corresponding decidability questions for logic. Theorem 15 also shows that the computational
powers of the players required to find a winning strategy vastly exceeds the computational power
required to determine the outcome, thus casting doubt on the adequateness of winning strategies
(or Nash equilibria) as adequate solution concepts for infinite sequential games3.
The results in Section 4 contrasted with those in Section 6 essentially show that the proofs
in [34, 35, 36, 37] are not too wasteful from a constructive perspective – i.e. the constructions
employed are not far less constructive than the theorems proven with them.
There are several immediate avenues for extending the work presented here: The restriction
to finite action sets (i.e. finitely branching trees) can mostly be lifted without a significant
impact on the proof techniques. Note though that the concrete Weihrauch degrees would change
drastically, as in Theorem 9 we would need to replace C{0,1}N by CNN , with the latter residing
in a less explored part of the Weihrauch lattice. The results in [36, 37] are more general than
covered here, too (with the same proof complexity). A notion of a product of sequential games
could, similarly to the use of a products of bimatrix games in [46] (see also [29, 28]), be used
to obtain some results on the products on the corresponding Weihrauch degrees. As in [36, 37],
one could extend Theorem 15 to games with real-valued payoff functions of prescribed level
(introduced by Hertling in [22, 23], see also [47, 13]).
The study of the strength of determinacy for particular pointclasses in reverse mathematics
presumably offers further proofs adaptable into the framework of Weihrauch reducibility, e.g. [44,
41, 15].
Another avenue to explore is the connection to the basic games introduced by Lachlan
[33] to formalize some meta-observations on the study of recursively enumerable sets. Kummer
showed that the basic games are equivalent to the computable Gale Stewart games in the dif-
ference hierarchy over Σ02 [32]. A natural restriction of the basic games can easily be shown to
produce computable Gale-Stewart games in the difference hierarchy over Σ01 as studied in this
paper. This raises the question whether here another equivalence can be obtained, which would
then allow us the transfer of our classifications to the setting of basic games4.
3Then of course, infinite sequential games could justifiably be deemed unrealistic anyway.
4This question was originally raised by an anonymous referee.
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A precise understanding of the Weihrauch degree of determinacy for various pointclasses is
related to determinacy questions of games with transfinite length (as studied in e.g. [39, 17]).
For example, Corollary 19 together with Borel determinacy implies that games of length ω + ω
and winning sets from the finite levels of the difference hierarchy are determined.
Further afield, understanding the Weihrauch degrees of determinacy principles may be a
contribution to the development of descriptive set theory in computational/category-theoretical
terms as suggested in [51]. In order to deal with determinacy beyond the Borel sets, one may
have to adopt the extended Weihrauch-degrees recently suggested by Bauer and Yoshimura
[2] as framework.
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